Exercise 3.5. Does the prospect of artificial intelligence make us doubt the authencity of human intelligence or is it forever a copy or fake version of human intelligence? Give reasons for both arguments.

My answer to the question in the exercise:

Arguments against the statement: Artificial Intelligence is a copy/fake version of human intelligence;

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not a copy neither a fake version of human intelligence. AI is a different type of intelligence that is determined by the nature of its origin. It is designed and constructed by humans, so it is just another object of constructed social reality as any human-made object. This constructed reality can live up to its laws and rules and evolve, especially if we think about the self-learning generation of AI. In some areas, AI exceeds the human brain’s capacity to perform many tasks much better, replacing people on the job market. However, by its physical structure and how it functions, simulating human-like cognitive functions, it is dramatically different from the human brain. Another aspect to consider is the fact that AI. At the same time, it outperforms humans in various cognitive tasks, still dramatically behind in certain essential areas such as emotional intelligence and intuition. AI cannot always come up with a precise medical diagnosis without a help of a human. AI cannot write software and find a software bug. It cannot do creative writing and make moral-ethical decisions. It cannot exercise free will, do philosophy, explain its decisions, and create from scratch and invent. AI still works at its best only if it is guided by humans and in collaboration with humans. These all make AI not just a copy of human intelligence but just another creation of the human mind as other pieces and elements of socially constructed reality;

Arguments, supporting the statement: Artificial Intelligence is a copy/fake version of human intelligence.

AI is a copy of human intelligence because it is able to simulate= imitate human’s brain activity, it can perform human brain like functions like solving mathematical problems, play chess, design things, write music, manage processes, imitate communication processes;

Exercise 3.6. “If one is a realist, rather than a constructivist, one is entitled to mourn the passing of a world less driven by technology, or merely hope things would be simpler in the future. One is also entitled to protest the continued appearance of stereotypes as misrepresentations and propose better, more “real” representation to come. But a constructivist is wrongly place to address such matters, even if the construction of society seems to legitimise the efforts to do so. One can not say the world is socially constructed and say there were misrepresentations.”

In this exercise we are asked to reflect on this statement above in as many words as necessary to form our own judgement.

Exercise 3.6. “If one is a realist, rather than a constructivist, one is entitled to mourn the passing of a world less driven by technology, or merely hope things would be simpler in the future. One is also entitled to protest the continued appearance of stereotypes as misrepresentations and propose better, more “real” representation to come. But a constructivist is wrongly place to address such matters, even if the construction of society seems to legitimise the efforts to do so. One can not say the world is socially constructed and say there were misrepresentations.”

In this exercise, we are asked to reflect on this statement above in as many words as necessary to form our judgement.

My answer: Constructivism and Realism differ only on the level of origin of things in an ontological sense. Realism insists on existing on the human mind-independent external reality, and it can be studied using scientific methods, while Constructivism argues everything around us is a socially constructed reality. In an epistemological sense, Realism and Constructivism do not contradict each other since they are both concerned with the human mind’s relation to reality. They ask the same questions: Do we know things, How, and When we know things. Realism does recognise the existence of socially constructed reality and individual subjective interpretation of reality and an independent external world. Social Constructivism accepts the external world’s existence but focuses on individual and collective perceptions, experiences, and learning processes that are developed about the external world.

In regards to the first part of the question, whether the one who is a realist rather than a constructivist should “mourn the passing of a world less driven than technology, or merely hope things would be simpler in future… protest the continued appearance of stereotypes as misrepresentations and propose better, more “real” real representations come”, I can say that it is not necessary should be a case. I think so because realists do recognise the existence of individually/collectively constructed knowledge=reality. Moreover they acknowledge “though the natural (or object) world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterwards works in a different (social (or cognitive)) world” (Philip J.Dobson,2002). It means that they do accept the technology as well as science or a stereotype=misrepresentation, which is an individual or collective thinking as part of the reality, which they call a “social product” or “transitive reality”. This reality inevitably emerged due to our contact with an external world and often developed to study this external independent world. 

Thus to “mourn the passing of a world less driven than technology…” would mean rejection of a massive part of reality which is a socially constructed reality- what Realists don’t do. As Philip J.Dobson mentions (2002):” The critical realists assert that “real objects” are value-laden observation”; the reality and the value-laden observation of reality operating in two different dimensions, one intransitive and relatively enduring; the other transitive and changing”. 

Regarding the second part of the question: “…One can not say the world is socially constructed and say there were misrepresentations“, I can say that the answer depends on the ground we consider the term. If we look at the definition (Oxford Languages Dictionary), misrepresentation “is the action or offence of giving a false or misleading account of the nature of something”. In socially constructed reality, we use the term “misrepresentation”, for example, in Law, meaning that misrepresentation can be a fraudulent action. Thus, in our socially constructed reality, humans agree about the legal term “misrepresentation”. Therefore, it does exist in our socially constructed reality; we study it and plan and execute specific actions based on this socially invented concept.

If we consider the term “misrepresentation” from a philosophy of science point of view, things look more complex. After I did readings about Representation and misrepresentation, I understood that “misrepresentation” is a pretty debatable thing because there is still no (Ilka Niniluoto, 2017): “…unified theory of representation which seeks connections between linguistics, cognitive science, aesthetics and philosophy of science”. Moreover, I found out that there is a whole concept of “antirepsentationalism” developed by Richard Rorty which (Ilka Niniluoto, 2017) quotes him: “…knowledge is not a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality”, what in general denies the notion of “representation” as a useful and meaningful philosophical term. In Visual Culture and aesthetics, this term, the idea of “representation”, is even more ambiguous since artists deliberately experiment with different kinds of representation modes, and some philosophers claimed that resemblance and similarity are a minimal basis for the notion of Representation. In her paper “Remarks on Representation and MisRepresentation” (2017), Ilka Niniluoto insists that American philosopher Charles S. Pierce (1839-1914) had developed a quite comprehensive theory of Representation – theory of semiotics, which states, as she quotes him: “a sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). A triadic model of Pierce’s semiotics models is opposite to Saussure’s dyadic model characterised by lacking this crucial element – an interprétant. 

It is clear that any definition, any theory of Representation, attempts to establish and describe a relationship between entities, objects, and structures. This relationship always assumes an act of interpretation by someone. As Ilka Niniluoto (2017) refers to Ron Giere (2006), there is no “representation without representers…. S uses X to represent W with purpose P”. But this description of the representation process has also been challenged by other philosophers who insisted that an additional component (especially for science sake) such as “some truthful knowledge about the purported target.’

The problem with theorising the notion “representation” is naturally linked with the same issue about the term “misrepresentation”, actually we can consider both of them as one philosophical question which hasn’t been resolved yet. While doing my research, I have found many articles debating this issue: Realism versus Constructivism in different aspects of our lives, from the philosophy of science, science teaching to international relations and mass media. I can say there is a lot of critique from both sides. I found a comprehensive and relevant article written by Wilhelm Kempf, “Social Constructivism and its implications for critical media studies”. The question of “whether the social construction of reality implies the arbitrariness of opinions” (Wilhelm Kempf, 2006). It does mean for the constructivist there is no misrepresentation.

An example of this is our mass media which are socially constructed phenomena. They often can be blamed by someone for escalating conflicts and exacerbating situations, bringing informational coverage that is biased or even strongly biased, or creating and spreading fake news. There are always people who take/accept this presented point of view as their rightful opinion. This constructivists `point of view is “based on an inadequate and logically incorrect understanding of truth and reality, and on lack of differentiation between facts and meanings, between truth and beliefs and between objective and subjective” (Wilhelm Kempf,2006). While constructivists, “claim that the concept of distorted reality cannot be upheld. Since the media are an active element of constructed reality, the one version of reality which is constructed by war reporting is a compatible with classical standards of truth as countless other versions” ( Wilhelm Kempf,2006). What means that for classical constructivist, there is no such term as “misrepresentation”, while for non-constructivists it does exist. 

Bibliography:

1. Simulation and Simulacra, Jean Baudrillard, 19981, University of Michigan, 1994, online on http://www.openlibrary.com, [accessed on May 3d, 2021];Critical Realism and information systems research: why bother with philosophy?, Philip J. Dobson,Information research, Vol. 7 No.2, January 2002, School of Management Information Systems, Edith Cowan University, Churchlands, Western Australia, abstract, online on http://www.informationr.net, (accessed online on May 18, 2021);
2. Critical realism, vs social constructivism & social constructivism: application to a social housing research study, Taylor, Simon Peter (2018), International Journal of Sciences: basic and applied research, 37 (2); pp 216-222, online on http://www.insight.cumbria.ac.uk, (accessed online on May 18, 2021);
3. Editors of Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Casual Theories of Mental Content, Feb 4, 2010, online on http://www.plato.stanford.edu; (accessed on May 18,2021);
4. Social Constructivism and its implications for critical media studies, Wilhelm Kempf, 2006, conflict & communication online, Vol.5; No.1, 2006, online on http://www.cco.regener-online.de (accessed on May 20, 2021);
5. Ilkka Niniluoto, Remarks on Representation and Misrepresentation, July 2017, University of Helsinki, Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies, online on http://www.helda.helsinki.fi (accessed online on May 20, 2021);

Below I put some notes from the book written by Jean Baudrillard, Simulation and Simulacra, 1981, published by the University of Michigan, 1994, [online] on http://www.openlibaray.com [accessed on May 5, 2021]; I put these notes to keep a better memory and understanding of his original concepts and an evidence of my reading.

(Page 2): “… the era of simulation is inaugurated by liquidation of all referentials-worse: with their artificial resurrection in the stems of signs, a material more malleable than meaning, in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalences, to all binary oppositions, to all combinatory algebra. It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor parody. It is a question of substitution the signs of the real for the real… never again will the real have a chance to produce itself”;

(page 5) :”This way the stake will always have been murderous power of images, murderers of the real, murderers of their own model, as the Byzantine icons could be those of divine identity. To this murderous power is poised that of representations as a dialectical power, the visible and intelligible mediation of the Real’;

(page 5):’ But what if God himself can be simulated, that is to say can be reduced to the signs that constitute faith? Then the while system becomes weightless, it is no longer itself anything but a gigantic simulacrum- not unreal, but a simulacrum, that is to say never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself, an interrupted circuit without reference or circumference’;

(page 6): “Representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value’. …’Simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum. Such would be the successive phases of the image: it is the reflection of a profound reality, it masks and denatures profound reality, it masks the absence of a profound reality. it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum;

(Page 12): “Disneyland is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulacra. It is first of all a plant of illusions and phantasms: the Pirates, the Frontier, the Future Word, etc. This imaginary world is supposed to insure the succès of the operation. But what attracts the crowds the most is without a doubt the social microcosm… The imaginary of Disneyland is either true nor false, it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate the fiction of the real in the opposite camp”.

(Page 29): “Such is the watershed of hyperreal sociality, in which the real is confused with the model, as in the statistical operation, or with the medium…. Such is the last stage of the social relation, ours, which is no longer one of persuasion (the classical age of propaganda, of ideology, of publicity, etc) but one of deterrence: “YOU are information, you are the social, you are the event, you have the word etc”.

(page 30): ” It is the whole traditional world of causality that is in question: the perspectival, determines mode, the ‘active’, critical mode, the analytic mode- the distinction between cause and effect, between active and passive, between subject and object, between the end and the means. It is in this case that one can say: TV is watching us, TV alienates us, TV informs us. In all this , one remains, dependant on the analytical conception of media, on an external active and effective agent, on ‘perspectival’ information with the horizon of the real and of meaning as the vanishing point’.

(page 77): ‘But the role of the hypermarket goes far beyond ‘consumption’, and the objects no longer have a specific reality there: what is primary is their serial, circular, spectacular arrangement- the future model of social relations. … A new morphogenesis has appeared, which comes from the cybernetic kind… , and whose form is nuclear and satellitic…With this factory, as with the hypermarket or the new university, one is no longer dealing with functions (commerce, work, knowledge, leisure) that are autonomized and displaced .., but with a model of disintegration of functions, … a polyfunctional nucleus, an ensemble of ‘black boxes’ with multiple inputs and outputs, the locus of convection and déstructuration. … a hyperreality, simultaneity of all the functions, without a past, a future, an operationality on every level’.